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How to share knowledge by gossiping
Andreas Herzig and Faustine Maffre
University of Toulouse, IRIT, 118, Route de Narbonne,
F-31062 Toulouse, France
We provide a logical investigation of a simple case of com-
munication in a network of agents called the gossip problem.
Its classical version is: given n agents each of which has a
secret—a fact not known to anybody else—, how many calls
does it take to achieve shared knowledge of all secrets, i.e.,
to reach a state where every agent knows every secret? Sev-
eral protocols achieving shared knowledge in 2(n−2) calls
exist and were proved to be optimal: no shorter sequence of
calls exists. We generalize that problem and focus on higher-
order shared knowledge: how many calls does it take to ob-
tain that everybody knows that everybody knows all secrets?
More generally, how many calls does it take to obtain shared
knowledge of order k? This cannot be achieved simply by
communicating facts: the agents also have to communicate
higher-order knowledge of facts. We give an algorithm that
works in (k+1)(n−2) calls. We analyse its properties in a
logic that we have investigated in previous work and that is
based on the concept of observability of propositional vari-
ables by agents: Dynamic Epistemic Logic of Propositional
Assignment and Observation DEL-PAO. This enables us in
particular to give a formal proof of correctness of the algo-
rithm.
Keywords: gossip protocol, epistemic logic, shared knowl-
edge, common knowledge, theory of mind, dynamic epis-
temic logic, visibility, observability
1. Introduction: the gossip problem and its
generalization
The gossip problem is typically introduced in the lit-
erature in the following terms [1,28]:
There are six agents each of which knows some se-
cret not known to anybody else. Two agents can
make a telephone call and exchange all secrets they
know. How many calls does it take to share all se-
crets, i.e., how many calls have to take place until
everybody knows all secrets?
call per couple of agents (i, j). This takes n(n−1) calls.
But one can do much better.
To warm up consider n=3. Let si denote agent i’s
secret. Shared knowledge can be attained in three calls,
as can be seen by inspecting the following protocol:
1. 1 calls 2: 1 tells s1, and 2 tells s2;
2. 1 calls 3: 1 tells s1 and s2, and 3 tells s3;
3. 1 calls 2: 1 tells s3.
After the second call, both 1 and 3 know s1∧s2∧s3. So
1 and 3 are both experts. However, 2 is not an expert
yet because she does not know 3’s secret: she only be-
comes an expert after the third call.
While the cases n=2 and n=3 are special, for n≥4
there is a general result saying that shared knowledge
can be achieved in 2(n−2) calls, and that it is impos-
sible to do better: there is no protocol with less than
2(n−2) calls [8,32,25].
In the present paper we are interested in contexts
where the goal is to achieve higher-order shared knowl-
edge: how many calls does it take to obtain that every-
body knows that everybody knows all secrets? More
generally, how many calls does it take to obtain shared
knowledge of order k? Such higher-order knowledge
is important for social intelligence: social interaction
requires the ability to reason about the other agents’
mental states. In other words, an agent should entertain
a theory of mind: she should have beliefs about other
agents’ beliefs, beliefs about what other agents believe
about her, etc. Epistemic logic is an interesting tool in
the investigation of theory of mind; see e.g. [12,24] for
recent work on the subject.
If we make the hypothesis that there is a global clock
and that everybody knows the protocol then things are
easy: 2(n−2) calls achieve not only shared knowledge
of all secrets, but also common knowledge of all se-
crets. Here we do not make that hypothesis and investi-
gate asynchronous contexts. In such contexts, for n= 2
it still holds that a single call makes all secrets not only
shared knowledge, but also common knowledge; how-
ever, for n > 2 common knowledge cannot be achieved
by a finite number of calls.
We are therefore more modest and consider the goal
of shared knowledge of order k. The original problem
The problem can be generalized to an arbitrary num-
bers of agents n≥2. A straightforward solution has one
is to reach shared knowledge of order k=1. Now con-
sider k=2. There, the agents cannot achieve the goal by
communicating facts alone: they also have to commu-
nicate what they know about the facts. Let us illustrate
this for n=3 agents. We modify the protocol for shared
knowledge of order 1 and let the agents communicate
knowledge instead of facts:
1. 1 calls 2: 1 tells K1s1, and 2 tells K2s2;
2. 1 calls 3: 1 tells K1s1, K1s2, K2s1 and K2s2, and 3
tells K3s3;
3. 1 calls 2: 1 tells K1s3, K3s1, K3s2 and K3s3,
where Kiϕ reads “agent i knows that ϕ is true”. After
the second call, 1 and 3 are both experts of level 1: both
know s1∧s2∧s3. However, none of them is an expert of
level 2 because none of them knows K2s3 (and so for
a good reason: K2s3 is not the case yet). The third call
makes both 1 and 2 experts of level 2. However, agent 3
is not an expert of level 2 yet: although K2s3 is the case,
agent 3 does not know this. To attain that level it takes
a further, fourth call between 1 and 3 (or, alternatively,
between 2 and 3). This shows that the first three calls
are not enough to obtain shared knowledge of order 2.
Our example illustrates that in order to attain shared
knowledge of level 2, it is useful to communicate
knowledge about facts (that is, knowledge of level 1). It
also illustrates that it takes more calls to achieve shared
knowledge of level k+1 than it takes to achieve shared
knowledge of level k.
We note Gossip(k,n) the instance of the general-
ized gossip problem with n≥2 agents and the goal to
achieve depth k≥1 of shared knowledge. So the orig-
inal problem corresponds to the instance Gossip(1,6).
A solution to Gossip(k,n) is a sequence of calls be-
tween agents resulting in shared knowledge of depth k
of all secrets by all agents. We are going to introduce
an algorithm solving Gossip(k,n) in (k+1)(n−2) calls,
for n≥ 4. Based on results in [18], we moreover estab-
lish that our algorithm is optimal: at least (k+1)(n−2)
calls are necessary to achieve the goal of Gossip(k,n).
Our proofs are formally rigorous: they are couched in
a dynamic epistemic logic that is called DEL-PAO (Dy-
namic Epistemic Logic of Propositional Assignment
and Observation), with epistemic operators Ki, for i
an agent, and dynamic operators [Callij], for i and j
two different agents. Building on previous work on
observability-based knowledge [31,36,35], we had in-
troduced and studied that logic in [26].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines
some notation. Section 3 presents our algorithm for
n≥ 4 agents. Section 4 recalls syntax and semantics of
the dynamic epistemic logic DEL-PAO. In Section 5 we
show how to capture the algorithm as a DEL-PAO pro-
gram. In Section 6 we prove in DEL-PAO that the algo-
rithm is correct and in Section 7 that our algorithm is
optimal. In Section 8 we study the special cases of two
and three agents and in Section 9 we briefly discuss a
version of the problem with goals involving ignorance.
Section 10 concludes.
2. Notation
In this section we introduce some notation in order
to be able to formally talk about the agents’ knowledge
and about gossip protocols. In Section 4 we are going
introduce a full-fledged logical language into which
that notation can be embedded.
Let Agt = {1, . . . ,n} be the set of all agents. The se-
cret of agent i is denoted by si. The set of propositional
variables is Prop = {si : i ∈ Agt}. To simplify things
we suppose that si is true. A more general framework
where secrets can be true or false can be found in [5,6].
2.1. Notation for knowledge
We write Kiϕ to express that agent i knows that the
formula ϕ is true.
The initial situation before the agents start gossiping
is expressed by
∧
i∈Agt
(
si∧Kisi∧
∧
j∈Agt, j 6=i
(
¬K jsi∧¬K j¬si
))
.
The goal of shared knowledge of level 1 is expressed
by the formula
∧
i∈Agt
Ki
( ∧
j∈Agt
s j
)
which says that every agent knows every secret. Let-
ting sJ abbreviate the conjunction
∧
i∈J si of secrets of
agents in J, we can write this more compactly as
∧
i∈Agt
KisAgt.
2.2. Notation for shared knowledge
Let EKJϕ denote the conjunction
∧
i∈J Kiϕ, for non-
empty sets of agents J ⊆ Agt. It describes situations
where ϕ is shared knowledge in J: each agent in J
knows that ϕ.
We can now describe several situations of shared
knowledge in a more convenient way:
– EKAgtsAgt expresses that all secrets are shared
knowledge;
– EKAgtEKAgtsAgt expresses that every agent knows
that all secrets are shared knowledge;
– EKAgt . . .EKAgt︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
sAgt expresses that all secrets are
shared knowledge up to depth k ≥ 1.
Let us also introduce an abbreviation for shared
knowledge of level m, for m≥ 0: we inductively define
EK0Jϕ = ϕ and EK
m+1
J ϕ = EKJEK
m
J ϕ. So the goal of
shared knowledge of level k of all agents can be written
EKkAgtsAgt.
We drop set parentheses and write si1,...,im instead of
s{i1,...,im} and EKi1,...,im instead of EK{i1,...,im}.
2.3. Notation for calls and gossip protocols
We express calls and their consequences by means
of modal operators of action as familiar from dynamic
logic. The action Callij expresses that i and j talk to
each other. (It does not matter who initiates the call.)
The formula [Callij]ϕ expresses that ϕ is true after i and
j talked to each other. So the formula
[Callij]EK{i, j}s{i, j}
expresses that the result of Callij is that the secrets
of i and j become shared knowledge of the group
{i, j}. With the above convention this can be written
[Callij]EKi, jsi, j. More generally, a call between i and j
achieves common knowledge between i and j: we have
[Callij]EK
m
i, jsi, j
for arbitrary m.
In the sequence of calls
Call
i1
j1
; . . . ;Callimjm ,
i1 calls j1 first, then i2 calls j2, . . . , and finally im calls
jm. The length of the sequence is m.
An instance of the generalized gossip problem, writ-
ten Gossip(k,n), is given by a number of agents n and
the level k of shared knowledge to be attained. A solu-
tion of Gossip(k,n) is a sequence of calls pi such that
∧
i∈Agt
(
si∧Kisi
)
→ [pi]EKkAgtsAgt
holds.
The above statements should be intuitively clear,
even we postpone the semantics of our language to
Section 4. Readers familiar with dynamic epistemic
logics may take the epistemic operators Ki to be oper-
ators of the standard epistemic logic S5 and may take
the actions Callij as private announcements made to
i and j [11,23,22,10,37]. The semantics we adopt is
going to be conceptually and mathematically simpler
than those of dynamic epistemic logics.
3. An algorithm achieving shared knowledge of
depth k
Let Gossip(k,n) be an instance of the generalized
gossip problem, for some k≥1 and n≥4. The following
algorithm generates a sequence of (k+1)(n−2) calls.
Throughout the algorithm, two of the agents, called
left and right, will play a central, fixed role: each of
the other agents only communicates with either left or
right. The n−2 remaining agents will be numbered 0,
1, . . ., n−3.
The algorithm is made up of turns. During each turn,
left and right collect the secrets of other agents. To-
gether with the last agent they talked to in that turn,
they thereby become what we call ‘semi-experts’. A
further call between complementary semi-experts turns
them into full experts. The last agents to which left and
right talked also play a crucial role. These two further
semi-experts alternate: they are permuted at each turn
in a way that will guarantee that the goal is reached.
Algorithm 1. For t = 0..k do
agent left calls agent 0−t (mod n−2);
agent left calls agent 1−t (mod n−2);
...
agent left calls agent n−3;
agent left calls agent 0;
agent left calls agent 1;
...
agent left calls agent n−4−t (mod n−2);
agent right calls agent n−3−t (mod n−2).
In words:
– At the first turn (turn 0), agent left calls agent 0,
then 1, . . . , then n−4, and finally agent right calls
agent n−3;
– At the second turn (turn 1), agent left calls agent
n−3, then 0, then 4, . . . , then n−5, and finally
agent right calls agent n−4;
– ... and so on.
So each turn involves n−2 calls, and overall the algo-
rithm produces a sequence of (k+1)(n−2) calls.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that every agent
index is taken modulo n−2 and omit “(mod n−2)”.
Figure 1 gives a visual representation of Algo-
rithm 1: agents 0, 1, . . ., n−3 are put on a wheel which,
between each turn, rotates clockwise. Agent left calls
everybody in ascending order—his sequence of calls is
depicted by an orange arrow—, except the agent at the
rightmost position of the wheel, then right (sequence
of calls in blue) calls this agent.
Theorem 1. The minimal number of calls needed to
solve the instance Gossip(k,n) of the generalized gos-
sip problem, for k ≥ 1 and n≥ 4, is (k+1)(n−2).
The main part of the paper is devoted to the proof of
the above theorem. In sections 6 and 7 we prove that
the sequence of calls produced by the algorithm is in-
deed a solution and that the goal cannot be achieved in
less calls. Our proofs will be done in the formal lan-
guage of the logic DEL-PAO; in the next two sections
we introduce the logic and show how to model calls
within its language.
4. Dynamic Epistemic Logic of Propositional
Assignment and Observation DEL-PAO
Dynamic Epistemic Logic of Propositional Assign-
ment and Observation DEL-PAO is grounded on the no-
tion of observability of propositional variables. It re-
fines a logic that was proposed and studied in a series
of papers by van der Hoek, Wooldridge and colleagues
under the names Epistemic Coalition Logic of Proposi-
tional Control with Partial Observability ECL-PC(PO)
[36] and Logic of Revelation and Concealment LRC
[35]. These logics stem from languages used in model
checkers such as MOCHA in order to compactly de-
scribe a distributed system [2,31,33]. The idea is that
each agent has a set of propositional variables she can
observe: no different truth value is possible for her. The
other way round, any combination of truth values of the
non-observable variables is possible for her. We recall
this logic now; more details are in [26]. Further devel-
opments of our work are reported in [14,16,27]. It can
also be related to approaches which aim at grounding
knowledge on a spatial notion of visibility [9,21].
4.1. Observability atoms
The atomic formulas of DEL-PAO are called visibil-
ity atoms and take the form Si1 Si2 ...Sim p, where p is a
propositional variable from a countable non-empty set
Prop and i1, i2, ..., im are agents from a finite non-empty
set Agt. When m=0 then we have nothing but a propo-
sitional variable. For m=1, the atom Si1 p reads “agent
i1 sees the value of the variable p” or “agent i1 sees
whether p is true or not”, and for m=2, the second-
order observation Si1 Si2 p reads “agent i1 sees whether
i2 sees the value of p”; and so on. Beyond individual
observability the language of DEL-PAO also accounts
for joint observability: the atom JSp reads “all agents
jointly see the value of p”. Metaphorically, joint atten-
tion about p is the case when there is eye contact be-
tween the agents when observing p. Joint visibility im-
plies individual visibility: when JS p is true then Si p
should also be true.
One can define first- and higher-order knowledge
about literals by means of conjunctions of visibility
atoms. Indeed, for a propositional variable p we have
that agent i knows that p is true when p is true and i
sees p. Similarly i knows that p is false when p is false
and i sees p. The list below collects some equivalences
that will be valid:
Ki p↔ p∧Si p
Ki¬p↔¬p∧Si p
¬Ki p∧¬Ki¬p↔¬Si p
K jKi p↔ p∧Si p∧S j p∧S j Si p
K jKi¬p↔¬p∧Si p∧S j p∧S j Si p
n-6
n-5
n-4
n-3
0
1
2
n-7
n-8
...
...
Turn 0
n-6
n-5
n-4
n-3
0
1
n-7
n-8
2
...
...
Turn 1
n-6
n-5
n-4
n-3
0
1
n-7
n-8
2
...
...
Turn 2
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the first three turns of Algorithm 1.
Formally, the set of observability operators is
OBS = {Si : i ∈ Agt}∪{JS},
where Si stands for individual visibility of agent i and
JS stands for joint visibility of all agents. The set of
all sequences of visibility operators is noted OBS∗ and
the set of all non-empty sequences is noted OBS+. We
use σ ,σ ′, . . . for elements of OBS∗. Finally, the set of
atomic formulas is
ATM = {σ p : σ ∈ OBS∗, p ∈ Prop}.
The elements of ATM are also called visibility atoms,
or atoms for short. For example, JSS2 q reads “all
agents jointly see whether agent 2 sees the value of
q”; in other words, there is joint attention in the group
of all agents concerning 2’s observation of q. The ele-
ments of ATM are noted α,α′, . . . ,β,β′, . . ..
4.2. Complex formulas
Beyond atomic formulas the language of DEL-PAO
has epistemic operators as well as actions, alias pro-
grams, assigning truth values to visibility atoms. It is
defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= α | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | Kiϕ | CKϕ | [pi]ϕ
pi ::=+α | −α | pi;pi | pi⊔pi | ϕ?
where α ranges over ATM and i over Agt.
Our atomic programs are assignments of truth val-
ues to atoms from ATM: +α makes α true and −α
makes α false. Complex programs are constructed
with dynamic logic operators: pi;pi′ is sequential com-
position (“first execute pi, then pi′”), pi ⊔ pi′ is non-
deterministic choice (“execute either pi or pi′, choos-
ing non-deterministically”), and ϕ? is test (“if ϕ is true
then continue the execution, else stop”). Just as in dy-
namic logic, the formula [pi]ϕ reads “after every execu-
tion of pi, ϕ is true”. The formula Kiϕ reads “i knows
that ϕ is true on the basis of what she observes”, and
CKϕ reads “all agents jointly know that ϕ is true on the
basis of what they jointly observe”. These epistemic
operators account for forms of individual and common
knowledge that are respectively obtained via individual
observation and joint observation of facts. They there-
fore differ conceptually from the classical operators of
individual and common knowledge as studied in the
area of epistemic logic [20].
The other boolean operators ⊤, ⊥, ∨, → and ↔ are
defined as abbreviations, and 〈pi〉ϕ (“there exists an ex-
ecution of pi after which ϕ is true”) abbreviates¬[pi]¬ϕ.
Moreover, skip abbreviates⊤? and fail abbreviates⊥?.
Finally, if ϕ then pi abbreviates (ϕ?;pi)⊔¬ϕ?.
The set of atomic formulas of ATM occurring in
the formula ϕ is noted ATM(ϕ); the set ATM(pi) is
defined similarly. For example, if pi = q?;+S2 p and
ϕ = [pi]S1 JS p → q, then ATM(pi) = {q,S2 p} and
ATM(ϕ) = {q,S2 p,S1 JS p}. (So JS p /∈ ATM(ϕ).)
4.3. Introspective valuations
The models of DEL-PAO are simply sets of visibil-
ity atoms. In order to guarantee positive and negative
introspection we have to ensure that agents are always
aware of what they see: for every agent i and propo-
sitional variable p, Si Si p has to be in every valuation.
More generally, a valuation V is introspective when it
contains every visibility atom having two consecutive
Si, such as S j Si Si Sk p. So in an introspective valuation
an agent is aware of what she sees, every agent sees
this, and every agent sees that every agent sees this, etc.
Formally, a valuation V ∈ 2ATM is introspective if
and only if the following hold, for every α ∈ ATM and
i ∈ Agt:
Si Si α ∈V (C1)
JSJSα ∈V (C2)
JSSi Si α ∈V (C3)
if JSα ∈V , then Si α ∈V (C4)
if JSα ∈V , then JSSi α ∈V (C5)
The set of all introspective valuations is noted INTR.
(C1) is about introspection of individual sight: an
agent always sees whether she sees the value of an
atom. (C2) requires the same for joint sight; indeed,
if JSα is true then JSJSα should be true by intro-
spection, and if JSα is false then all agents jointly see
that at least one of them has broken eye contact. (C3)
forces the first to be common knowledge. (C4) guar-
antees that joint visibility implies individual visibility.
Constraints (C4) and (C5) guarantee that JSα ∈V im-
plies σα ∈ V for σ ∈ OBS+. This motivates the fol-
lowing relation of introspective consequence between
atoms: α❀ β iff either α = β, or α = JSα′ and β =
σα′ for some σ .
Proposition 1 ([26]). A valuation V ∈ 2ATM is in-
trospective if and only if, for every α,β ∈ ATM and
i ∈ Agt:
σSi Si α ∈V for every σ ∈ OBS
∗ (1)
σJSα ∈V for every σ ∈ OBS+ (2)
if α ∈V and α❀ β then β ∈V (3)
An atom α ∈ ATM is valid in INTR if and only if α
belongs to every valuation in INTR. By Proposition 1,
α is valid in INTR if and only if α is of the form either
σSi Si α with σ ∈ OBS
∗, or σJSα with σ ∈ OBS+.
4.3.1. Indistinguishability relations between
valuations
Two valuations are related by the indistinguishabil-
ity relation for agent i, noted ∼i, if every α that i sees
has the same value. Similarly, we have a relation ∼Agt
for joint indistinguishability. They are defined as fol-
lows:
V∼iV
′ iff Si α ∈V implies V (α) =V
′(α)
V∼AgtV
′ iff JSα ∈V implies V (α) =V ′(α)
where we write V (α) = V ′(α) when α has the same
truth value in V and V ′, i.e., when either α ∈ V and
α ∈V ′, or α /∈V and α /∈V ′.
It is proven in [26] that ∼i and ∼Agt are equivalence
relations on the set of introspective valuations INTR
and that no valuation of INTR is ∼i- or ∼Agt-related to
valuations outside of INTR.
4.3.2. Truth conditions and validity
Given an introspective valuation V , update opera-
tions add or remove atoms from V . This requires some
care: the resulting valuation should also be introspec-
tive. For example, removing Si Si p should be impossi-
ble. Another example is when V does not contain Si p:
then V ∪{JS p} would violate (C4). So when adding
an atom to V one also has to add all its positive conse-
quences. Symmetrically, when removing an atom one
also has to remove its negative consequences. Let us
define the following:
Eff+(α) = {β ∈ ATM : α❀ β}
Eff−(α) = {β ∈ ATM : β❀ α}
Clearly, when V is introspective then both V ∪Eff+(α)
and V \Eff−(α) are so, too (unless α is valid in INTR).
Now the truth conditions are as follows:
V |= α iff α ∈V
V |= ¬ϕ iff V 6|= ϕ
V |= ϕ∧ψ iff V |= ϕ and V |= ψ
V |= Kiϕ iff V
′ |= ϕ for all V ′ such that V ∼i V
′
V |= CKϕ iff V ′ |= ϕ for all V ′ such that V ∼Agt V
′
V |= [pi]ϕ iff V ′ |= ϕ for all V ′ such that V RpiV
′
where Rpi is a binary relation on valuations that is de-
fined (by mutual recursion with the definition of |=)
by:
V R+αV
′ iff V ′ =V ∪Eff+(α)
V R−αV
′ iff V ′ =V \Eff−(α) and
α is not valid in INTR
V Rpi1;pi2V
′ iff there is U such that V Rpi1U and URpi2V
′
V Rpi1⊔pi2V
′ iff V Rpi1V
′ or V Rpi2V
′
V Rϕ?V
′ iff V =V ′ and V |= ϕ
The relation Rpi is defined just as in PDL for
the program operators ;, ⊔ and ?. The interpreta-
tion of assignments is designed in a way such that
we stay in INTR: the program +α adds all the pos-
itive consequences of α; the program −α fails if α
is valid in INTR and otherwise removes all the nega-
tive consequences of α. For example, we never have
V R−S1 S1 pV
′, i.e., the program −S1 S1 p always fails.
In contrast, the program −S1 S2 p always succeeds,
and we have V R−S1 S2 p (V \ {S1 S2 p,JSS2 p,JS p})
because the only atoms—beyond S1 S2 p itself—whose
consequence is S1 S2 p are JSS2 p and JS p. Therefore
V 6|= [−S1 S2 p]JS p for every V .
Similarly to the relations ∼i and ∼Agt, it is proven
in [26] that each Rpi only relates valuations in INTR to
valuations in INTR. Therefore there is no risk to leave
the set of introspective valuations when interpreting a
modal operator.
When V |= ϕ we say that V is a model of ϕ. The set
of (not necessarily introspective) models of ϕ is noted
‖ϕ‖. A formula ϕ is satisfiable in INTR if ϕ has an in-
trospective model, i.e., if ‖ϕ‖∩ INTR 6= /0; it is valid in
INTR if INTR ⊆ ‖ϕ‖. In this case, we also say that ϕ
is a validity of DEL-PAO. A formula ϕ is plainly sat-
isfiable if it has a model, i.e., if ‖ϕ‖ 6= /0; it is plainly
valid if ϕ is true in all models, i.e., if ‖ϕ‖= 2ATM . For
example, JS p∧¬Si p is plainly satisfiable but not sat-
isfiable in INTR. On the other hand, ¬[−S1 S2 p]JS p is
valid in INTR (and even plainly valid).
4.4. Relevant atoms
For atoms, the connection between visibility and
knowledge is clear: the equivalences
Kiα↔ Si α∧α
Ki¬α↔ Si α∧¬α
are plainly valid. This motivates the notion of rele-
vant atoms of a formula ϕ and of a program pi, noted
RATM(ϕ) and RATM(pi), that is defined recursively as
follows:
RATM(α) = {α}
RATM(¬ϕ) = RATM(ϕ)
RATM(ϕ∧ϕ′) = RATM(ϕ)∪RATM(ϕ′)
RATM(Kiϕ) = RATM(ϕ)∪{Si α : α ∈ RATM(ϕ)}
RATM(CKϕ) = RATM(ϕ)∪{JSα : α ∈ RATM(ϕ)}
RATM([pi]ϕ) = RATM(pi)∪RATM(ϕ)
RATM(+α) = {α}
RATM(−α) = {α}
RATM(pi;pi′) = RATM(pi)∪RATM(pi′)
RATM(pi⊔pi′) = RATM(pi)∪RATM(pi′)
RATM(ϕ?) = RATM(ϕ)
For example,
RATM(q∧CKKi p) = {q, p,Si p,JS p,JSSi p}
This illustrates that RATM(ϕ) includes ATM(ϕ): we
have ATM(q∧CKKi p) = {q, p}.
In the gossip problem, we will mainly be interested
in (conjunctions of) formulas of the form Ki1 . . .Kimα.
Here are two useful properties of such formulas.
Lemma 1. The equivalence
Ki1 . . .Kimα↔
( ∧
β∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim α)
β
)
is plainly valid, for m≥ 0.
Proof. We use induction on m. For m = 0 we have
RATM(α) = α and the equivalence is obvious. For
m≥ 1, suppose
Ki1 . . .Kimα↔
( ∧
β∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim α)
β
)
is plainly valid. Take V ∈ 2ATM . Then:
V |= KiKi1 . . .Kimα
iff V |= Ki
( ∧
β∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim α)
β
)
iff V |=
( ∧
β∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim α)
Kiβ
)
iff V |=
( ∧
β∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim α)
(β∧Si β)
)
iff V |=
( ∧
β∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim α)
β
)
∧
( ∧
β∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim α)
Si β
)
iff V |=
( ∧
β∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim α)
β
)
∧
( ∧
β∈{Si γ:γ∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim α)}
β
)
iff V |=
( ∧
β∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim α)∪
{Si γ:γ∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim α)}
β
)
iff V |=
( ∧
β∈RATM(KiKi1 ...Kim α)
β
)
,
hence the result.
We write 〈r1, . . . ,rp〉 ⊑ 〈1, . . . ,m〉 when 〈r1, . . . ,rp〉
is a subsequence of {1, . . . ,m}. For example, we have
〈1,3,4〉 ⊑ 〈1,2,3,4,5〉 and 〈〉 ⊑ 〈1,2,3,4,5〉 but not
〈1,4,3〉 ⊑ 〈1,2,3,4,5〉.
Lemma 2. We have, for m≥ 0:
RATM(Ki1 . . .Kimα) =
{Sir1 . . .Sirp α : 〈r1, . . . ,rp〉 ⊑ 〈1, . . . ,m〉}
Proof. We use induction on m. The case m = 0 is obvi-
ous since RATM(α) = {α} and the only subsequence
of 〈〉 is 〈〉. For m≥ 1, suppose
RATM(Ki1 . . .Kimα) =
{Sir1 . . .Sirp α : 〈r1, . . . ,rp〉 ⊑ 〈1, . . . ,m〉}.
Then:
RATM(KℓKi1 . . .Kimα)
= RATM(Ki1 . . .Kimα) ∪
{Sℓ α
′ : α′ ∈ RATM(Ki1 . . .Kimα)}
= {Sir1 . . .Sirp α : 〈r1, . . . ,rp〉 ⊑ 〈1, . . . ,m〉} ∪
{Sℓ α
′ : α′ ∈ {Sir1 . . .Sirp α :
〈r1, . . . ,rp〉 ⊑ 〈1, . . . ,m〉}}
= {Sir1 . . .Sirp α : 〈r1, . . . ,rp〉 ⊑ 〈1, . . . ,m〉} ∪
{Sℓ Sir1 . . .Sirp α : 〈r1, . . . ,rp〉 ⊑ 〈1, . . . ,m〉}
= {Sir1 . . .Sirp α : 〈r1, . . . ,rp〉 ⊑ 〈ℓ,1, . . . ,m〉},
hence the result.
Lemma 1 tells us that relevant atoms provide a link
between visibility atoms—that are modified by the
calls—and epistemic operators. Lemmas 1 and 2 will
be useful in the next section when we will study prop-
erties of gossip calls.
5. Expressing calls in the language of DEL-PAO
Our logic provides the resources we need to model
calls between agents and to reason about the evolution
of their knowledge. Before proving that our algorithm
is correct we show how to express calls and we estab-
lish their properties.
In the standard version of the gossip problem, agents
only communicate their factual knowledge. As we
have seen, they also have to tell what they know about
others in order to achieve higher-order knowledge: for
shared knowledge of level k they have to exchange all
their knowledge up to depth k−1.
Let k be the level of shared knowledge to be attained.
Let i and j be two agents. For a given integer m, we
note {Si,S j}
≤m the set all non-empty sequences of vis-
ibility operators Si and S j of length at most m. For ex-
ample:
{Si,S j}
≤2 = {Si,S j,Si Si,Si S j,S j Si,S j S j}.
Then Callij is the sequential composition of programs
of the form:
if KiKi1 · · ·Kims∨K jKi1 · · ·Kims
then +σ1Si1 · · ·Sim s; . . . ;+σℓSi1 · · ·Sim s
for secret s in Prop, integer m≤ k−1, agents i1, . . . , im ∈
Agt and sequences {Si,S j}
≤k−m = {σ1, . . . ,σℓ}. For
example, for k = 3 the following is an element of the
sequence:
if KiKℓs∨K jKℓs
then +Si Sℓ s;+S j Sℓ s;+Si Si Sℓ s;+Si S j Sℓ s;
+S j Si Sℓ s;+S j S j Sℓ s
That piece of program tests whether Kℓs is known by i
or j and if so makes Sℓ s visible for both i and j and i’s
observation of Sℓ s visible for j, and vice versa. (Ob-
serve that the additions +Si Si Sk s and +S j S j Sk s are
trivial because they are introspectively valid.)
Some properties of the program Callij and its inter-
action with the shared knowledge operator via the rel-
evant atoms will be useful in our proofs.
First of all, the dynamic operators [Callij] and the
shared knowledge operators EKJ are normal modal op-
erators. So in particular
[Callij]ϕ∧ [Call
i
j]ψ↔ [Call
i
j](ϕ∧ψ)
and
(EKJϕ∧EKJψ)↔ EKJ(ϕ∧ψ)
are plainly valid. Moreover, we can put coalitions to-
gether: the schema
(EKJ1ϕ∧EKJ2ϕ)↔ EKJ1∪J2ϕ
is plainly valid for every J1,J2 ⊆ Agt. (To see this re-
duce EK according to its definition.) Finally, calls pre-
serve positive knowledge and produce shared knowl-
edge, which is a property that we state formally:
Proposition 2. Let s ∈ {si : i ∈ Agt} and m ≥ 0. Let
ϕ be of the form either Ki1 . . .Kims or EKJ1 . . .EKJms.
Then the formulas:
ϕ→ [Callij]ϕ (Prsv)
Kiϕ→ [Call
i
j]EK
k−m
i, j ϕ (Incr)
are plainly valid.
Proof. We prove each implication thanks to properties
of DEL-PAO.
The proof of (Prsv) is straightforward: it is plainly
valid because ϕ does not contain negations and calls
only make atoms true.
The proof of (Incr) is a bit more involved. We only
prove the case where ϕ = Ki1 . . .Kims; the case ϕ =
EKJ1 . . .EKJms is similar since EKJ is a conjunction of
Ki. We have seen in Lemma 1 that
ϕ↔
( ∧
β∈RATM(ϕ)
β
)
is plainly valid. Moreover, we have:
RATM(EKmi, jϕ) = {σα : α ∈ RATM(ϕ),
σ ∈ {Si,S j}
≤m}
by the definition of RATM(.). Therefore we want to
prove that:
Kiϕ→ [Call
i
j]
( ∧
β∈{σα:α∈RATM(ϕ),σ∈{Si,S j}≤k−m}
β
)
.
We have:
KiKi1 . . .Kims→ KiKir1 . . .Kirp s,
for every 〈r1, . . . ,rp〉 ⊑ 〈1, . . . ,m〉, by axiom T of stan-
dard epistemic logic. Since KiKir1 . . .Kirp s obviously
implies KiKir1 . . .Kirp s∨K jKir1 . . .Kirp s, for every sub-
set 〈r1, . . . ,rp〉 ⊑ 〈1, . . . ,m〉, we have:
KiKi1 . . .Kims→ [Call
i
j]
( ∧
β∈{σSir1
...Sirp s:σ∈{Si,S j}
≤k−p}
β
)
,
by the definition of the programs composing Callij.
This means that:
KiKi1 . . .Kims→ [Call
i
j]
( ∧
β∈{σSir1
...Sirp s:σ∈{Si,S j}
≤k−m}
β
)
,
because p≤ m. Since this is true for any 〈r1, . . . ,rp〉 ⊑
〈1, . . . ,m〉, we can apply Lemma 2 and obtain:
KiKi1 . . .Kims→ [Call
i
j]
( ∧
β∈{σα:α∈RATM(Ki1 ...Kim s),
σ∈{Si,S j}
≤k−m}
β
)
,
which is our result.
Formally, the program corresponding to the turn t of
Algorithm 1 is therefore:
turnt = Call
left
n−2−t ; . . . ;Call
left
n−3;Call
left
0 ; . . . ;Call
left
n−4−t ;
Call
right
n−3−t .
6. Correctness of the algorithm
We now prove that the algorithm returns a solution.
Let us write the set of agents as
Agt = {left,right,0, . . . ,n−3}.
Remember that Prop= {si : i∈Agt} is the set of propo-
sitional variables. The initial state is modelled by the
valuation
V0 = {si : i ∈ Agt} ∪ {Si si : i ∈ Agt} ∪
{α : α is valid in INTR}.
So all secrets are true, each agent knows her own se-
cret, and moreover the introspectively valid atoms are
true (so V0 is introspective). We have:
V0 |=
∧
i∈Agt
(
Kisi∧
∧
j∈Agt, j 6=i
¬K jsi
)
.
An agent is an expert for depth t if her personal goal
for depth t is reached. Precisely, agent i is an expert for
depth t ≥ 1 if and only if we have:
KiEK
t−1
Agt sAgt.
The dynamic modalities of DEL-PAO nicely allow to
express that a further call would turn an agent i into an
expert, i.e., that i is a semi-expert. Indeed, two agents i
and j are complementary for depth t (‘semi-experts’),
noted complt(i, j), if a call between i and j would make
them both experts for depth t. More formally:
complt(i, j)
def
= [Callij]EKi, jEK
t−1
Agt sAgt.
Furthermore, two pairs of agents (i1, i2) and ( j1, j2) are
complementary for depth t if and only if we have:
complt(i1, j1)∧ complt(i1, j2) ∧
complt(i2, j1)∧ complt(i2, j2).
We will prove that at each turn, two pairs of agents
are complementary: the first pair is agent left along
with the last agent she called at this turn, and the sec-
ond is agent right along with the last (and only agent)
she called at this turn.
The first turn is a special case where semi-experts of
depth 1 are produced.
Lemma 3. We have:
V0 |= [turn0]
(
EKleft,n−4sleft,0,...,n−4 ∧
EKright,n−3sright,n−3
)
.
Proof. Let us simply write “i j” for the call between i
and j in proofs. The first turn (turn 0) of Algorithm 1
produces the following sequence of calls:
left0; left1; . . . ; left(n−4);right(n−3).
By formula (Incr) of Proposition 2 we have:
V0 |= [Call
left
0 ]EKleft,0sleft,0
and therefore:
V0 |= [Call
left
0 ]Kleftsleft,0.
We do the same for the next call:
V0 |= [Call
left
0 ;Call
left
1 ]EKleft,1sleft,0,1
⇒ V0 |= [Call
left
0 ;Call
left
1 ]Kleftsleft,0,1.
And so on until:
V0 |= [Call
left
0 ;Call
left
1 ; . . . ;Call
left
n−4]
EKleft,n−4sleft,0,1,...,n−4.
In the same vein we also have:
V0 |= [Call
right
n−3 ]EKright,n−3sright,n−3.
By (Prsv) of Proposition 2 we then obtain:
V0 |= [Call
left
0 ; . . . ;Call
left
n−4;Call
right
n−3 ](
EKleft,n−4sleft,0,...,n−4 ∧
EKright,n−3sright,n−3
)
which is the same as:
V0 |= [turn0]
(
EKleft,n−4sleft,0,...,n−4 ∧
EKright,n−3sright,n−3
)
,
hence the result.
We now characterize the turns after turn0.
Lemma 4. For t ≥ 1, we have:
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt ](
EKleft,n−4−tEKleft,0−t,...,n−4−tEK
t−1
Agt sAgt ∧
EKright,n−3−tEKright,n−3−tEK
t−1
Agt sAgt
)
.
Proof. We use induction on t. Both cases resemble the
proof of Lemma 3.
Base case: t = 1. Turn 1 of Algorithm 1 produces the
following sequence:
left(n−3); left0; left1; . . . ; left(n−5);right(n−4).
By Lemma 3 and (Incr) of Proposition 2 we have:
V0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3]EKleft,n−3EKleft,n−3sAgt
⇒ V0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3]KleftEKleft,n−3sAgt.
Then again by (Incr):
V0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3;Call
left
0 ]EKleft,0EKleft,n−3,0sAgt
⇒ V0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3;Call
left
0 ]KleftEKleft,n−3,0sAgt,
and for the next call:
V0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3;Call
left
0 ;Call
left
1 ]
EKleft,1EKleft,n−3,0,1sAgt
⇒V0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3;Call
left
0 ;Call
left
1 ]
KleftEKleft,n−3,0,1sAgt,
and so on until:
V0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3;Call
left
0 ;Call
left
1 ; . . . ;Call
left
n−5]
EKleft,n−5EKleft,n−3,0,1,...,n−5sAgt.
Similarly we have:
V0 |= [turn0][Call
right
n−4 ]EKright,n−4EKright,n−4sAgt.
Finally we obtain the result by (Prsv) of Proposi-
tion 2:
V0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3;Call
left
0 ; . . . ;Call
left
n−5;Call
right
n−4 ](
EKleft,n−5EKleft,n−3,0,1,...,n−5sAgt ∧
EKright,n−4EKright,n−4sAgt
)
,
that is:
V0 |= [turn0; turn1](
EKleft,n−5EKleft,n−3,0,1,...,n−5sAgt ∧
EKright,n−4EKright,n−4sAgt
)
.
Inductive case. The reasoning is similar, but general-
ized to turn t+1. Suppose the formula is true for turn t.
The turn t +1 is:
left(n−3−t); left(0−t); . . . ; left(n−5−t);right(n−4−t).
By our induction hypothesis and (Incr) of Proposi-
tion 2 we have:
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt ][Call
left
n−3−t ]
EKleft,n−3−tEKleft,n−3−tEKAgtEK
t−1
Agt sAgt,
that is:
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt ][Call
left
n−3−t ]
EKleft,n−3−tEKleft,n−3−tEK
t
AgtsAgt,
which implies:
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt ][Call
left
n−3−t ]
KleftEKleft,n−3−tEK
t
AgtsAgt.
Then by (Prsv) of Proposition 2:
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt ][Call
left
n−3−t ;Call
left
0−t ]
EKleft,0−tEKleft,n−3−t,0−tEK
t
AgtsAgt
⇒V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt ][Call
left
n−3−t ;Call
left
0−t ]
KleftEKleft,n−3−t,0−tEK
t
AgtsAgt,
. . . and so on until:
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt ][Call
left
n−3−t ;Call
left
0−t ; . . . ;
Call
left
n−5−t ]
EKleft,n−5−tEKleft,n−3−t,0−t,...,n−5−tEK
t
AgtsAgt.
Moreover, by (Incr):
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt ][Call
right
n−4−t ]
EKright,n−4−tEKright,n−4−tEKAgtEK
t−1
Agt sAgt,
that is:
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt ][Call
right
n−4−t ]
EKright,n−4−tEKright,n−4−tEK
t
AgtsAgt.
We end as usual with (Prsv):
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt ][Call
left
n−3−t ; . . . ;
Call
left
n−5−t ;Call
right
n−4−t ](
EKleft,n−5−tEKleft,n−3−t,...,n−5−tEK
t
AgtsAgt ∧
EKright,n−4−tEKright,n−4−tEK
t
AgtsAgt
)
⇔V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt ; turnt+1](
EKleft,n−5−tEKleft,n−3−t,...,n−5−tEK
t
AgtsAgt ∧
EKright,n−4−tEKright,n−4−tEK
t
AgtsAgt
)
,
which is our result for t+1.
Lemma 5. After turn t−1 of Algorithm 1, the pairs
(left,n−3−t) and (right,0−t) are complementary for
depth t.
Proof. From Lemma 4 we can deduce:
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt−1](
KleftEKleft,1−t,...,n−3−tEK
t−2
Agt sAgt ∧
KrightEKright,0−tEK
t−2
Agt sAgt
)
.
Applying (Incr) of Proposition 2 we obtain:
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt−1][Call
left
right]
EKleft,rightEKAgtEK
t−2
Agt sAgt,
that is:
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt−1][Call
left
right]
EKleft,rightEK
t−1
Agt sAgt,
which is equivalent to:
V0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt−1]complt(left,right).
By the same reasoning for left and 0−t, right and
n−3−t, and finally n−3−t and 0−t, we obtain that
each of them are complementary, hence the result.
Lemma 6. The goal for depth t, EKtAgtsAgt, is reached
after turn t of Algorithm 1.
Proof. Turn t of Algorithm 1 is:
left(0−t), left(1−t), . . . , left(n−4−t),right(n−3−t).
By Lemma 5, after turn t−1 and the first call left(0−t)
of turn t, agents left and 0−t become experts for depth
t. (Thus EKleft,0−tEK
t−1
Agt sAgt.) Then after the n−4 calls
left(1−t), . . . , left(n−4−t) we get by (Incr) of Propo-
sition 2:
K1−tEK
t−1
Agt sAgt ∧ . . .∧Kn−4−tEK
t−1
Agt sAgt,
that is, 1−t, . . ., n−4−t are all experts for depth t.
Finally, after the last call right(n−3−t), and also by
Lemma 5, agents right and n−3−t become experts for
depth t. (Thus EKright,n−3−tEK
t−1
Agt sAgt.) Hence after the
n−2 calls of turn t we have EKAgtEK
t−1
Agt sAgt, which is
equivalent to EKtAgtsAgt.
Proposition 3. The sequence resulting from Algo-
rithm 1 gives a solution to the generalized gossip prob-
lem for k≥1 and n≥4.
Proof. By Lemma 6, the goal for depth t is reached
after turn t of Algorithm 1. Thus the goal for depth k is
reached after turn k (k+1 turns), i.e., at the end of the
algorithm.
Proposition 3 implies that at most (k+1)(n−2) calls
are required to solve the instance Gossip(k,n) of the
generalized gossip problem.
7. Optimality of the algorithm
In this section, we prove that the sequence of calls
returned by our algorithm has an optimal length. Our
optimality result is derived from that of [18].
We first prove a property of the gossip problem that
may seem obvious but that we prefer to clarify.
Lemma 7. Suppose m agents know a fact ϕ not known
to the remaining agents. Then it takes at least n−m
calls for the remaining agents to learn ϕ.
Proof. It suffices to prove that a call Callij increases
the knowledge on a fact ϕ of at most one agent. We
distinguish four cases, depending on the knowledge of
i and j about ϕ.
– Neither i nor j know ϕ. Then Kiϕ∨K jϕ is false
and no agent knows ϕ after Callij.
– i knows ϕ but j does not know ϕ. Then Kiϕ∨
K jϕ is true and both agents know ϕ after Call
i
j,
but only j learned it.
– i does not know ϕ but j knows ϕ. Then Kiϕ∨
K jϕ is true and both agents know ϕ after Call
i
j,
but only i learned it.
– i and j know ϕ. Then Kiϕ∨K jϕ is true and both
agents know ϕ after Callij, but no one learned it.
Therefore n−m calls are necessary to spread a piece of
gossip to n−m agents.
Proposition 4. The minimal number of calls needed to
solve the instance Gossip(k,n) of the generalized gos-
sip problem, for k≥1 and n≥4, is at least (k+1)(n−2).
Proof. We use induction on k.
Base case: k=1. As we have seen, for k=1 the lower
bound 2(n−2) was established in the literature [8,32,
25].
Inductive case. Suppose that at least (k+1)(n−2)
calls are needed to achieve the goal for depth k. This
implies that after (k+1)(n−2)− 1 calls, at least one
agent, let us call her i, does not know a piece of infor-
mation of depth k−1:
V0 |= [Call
i1
j1
; . . . ;Call
i(k+1)(n−2)−1
j(k+1)(n−2)−1
]¬KiKℓ1 · · ·Kℓk−1s.
Remark that i could also ignore facts of a lower depth;
in this case she would also ignore facts of depth k−1
by the truth axiom T. For example, suppose that i does
not know the secret of 1; then she cannot know that 2
knows the secret of 1, and that 1 knows that 2 knows
the secret of 1, and so on.
Then the (k+1)(n−2)-th call involves i (otherwise
her knowledge does not evolve) and another agent, say
j. It establishes not only KiKℓ1 · · ·Kℓk−1s and thus the
goal for depth k:
V0 |= 〈Call
i1
j1
; . . . ;Call
i(k+1)(n−2)−1
j(k+1)(n−2)−1
〉〈Callij〉
EKkAgtsAgt,
but also the fact that i and j both know this:
V0 |= 〈Call
i1
j1
; . . . ;Call
i(k+1)(n−2)−1
j(k+1)(n−2)−1
〉〈Callij〉
EKi, jEK
k
AgtsAgt,
while no other agent does:
V0 |= [Call
i1
j1
; . . . ;Call
i(k+1)(n−2)−1
j(k+1)(n−2)−1
][Callij]( ∧
ℓ∈Agt\{i, j}
¬KℓEK
k
AgtsAgt
)
.
To establish the goal for depth k+1, i.e., to establish
EKAgtEK
k
AgtsAgt, it is necessary to distribute EK
k
AgtsAgt
from i and j to all other agents. By Lemma 7, we know
that this takes at least n−2 calls. Therefore, we need
(k+1)(n−2)+n−2=(k+2)(n−2) calls to achieve the
goal for depth k+1.
Propositions 3 and 4 together ensure Theorem 1, i.e.,
that the minimal number of calls needed to solve the in-
stance Gossip(k,n) of the generalized gossip problem,
for k ≥ 1 and n≥ 4, is exactly (k+1)(n−2).
8. The case of two and three agents
Our algorithm only works when four or more agents
are involved; it cannot be applied when there are only
two and three agents.
The former case is easy: only one call is necessary
for two agents to reach knowledge on their secrets of
level k, whatever k is. (This is ensured by formula
(Incr) of Proposition 2.) Obviously, less calls are not
sufficient given the agents’ initial ignorance about the
other’s secret.
Consider the case of three agents, say 0, 1 and 2. We
give an algorithm that takes k+2 turns of one call each.
Algorithm 2. For t = 0..k do
agent 0 calls agent (t (mod 2))+1.
The algorithm consists in sequences of the form
Call01;Call
0
2;Call
0
1;Call
0
2; . . ., k+2 times. Hence each
turn contains one call: turn0 = Call
0
1, turn1 = Call
0
2,
turn2 = Call
0
1, and so on. We prove that the algorithm
is correct and optimal.
Theorem 2. The minimal number of calls to solve the
instance Gossip(k,3) of the generalized gossip prob-
lem, for k ≥ 1, is k+2.
Proposition 5. The sequence resulting from Algo-
rithm 2 gives a solution to the generalized gossip prob-
lem for k≥1 and n=3.
Proof. We use induction on k.
Base case: k=1. It is easy to check that the sequence
Call01;Call
0
2;Call
0
1 establishes the goal for depth 1.
Inductive case. Suppose k+2 turns of the algorithm
achieve the goal for depth k:
V0 |= [turn0; turn1; . . . ; turnk+2]EK
k
AgtsAgt.
Because turnk+2 = Call
0
(k+2 (mod 2))+1, we also have:
V0 |= [turn0; turn1; . . . ; turnk+2]
EK0,(k+2 (mod 2))+1EK
k
AgtsAgt,
which implies:
V0 |= [turn0; turn1; . . . ; turnk+2]
K0EK
k
AgtsAgt,
and hence by (Incr) of Proposition 2:
V0 |= [turn0; turn1; . . . ; turnk+2][turnk+3]
EK0,(k+3 (mod 2))+1EK
k
AgtsAgt.
since turnk+3 = Call
0
(k+3 (mod 2))+1. Therefore, be-
cause 0, (k+2 (mod 2)) + 1 and k+3 (mod 2)) + 1
are all different, we obtain by formula (Prsv) of Propo-
sition 2:
V0 |=[turn0; turn1; . . . ; turnk+2][turnk+3]
EKAgtEK
k
AgtsAgt,
that is:
V0 |=[turn0; turn1; . . . ; turnk+2; turnk+3]
EKk+1Agt sAgt,
which is our goal for depth k+1.
Proposition 6. The minimal number of calls needed to
solve the instance Gossip(k,3) of the generalized gos-
sip problem, for k≥1, is at least k+2.
Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of optimality
for n≥ 4 (see Proposition 4).
Base case: k=1. It was proven—and it is easy to
check—that 3 calls are necessary, in the original prob-
lem, when three agents are involved [8,32,25].
Inductive case. Suppose that at least k+2 calls are
necessary to achieve the goal for depth k. Then after
k+1 calls, at least one agent i does not know a piece
of information of depth k−1. The k+2-th call, between
i and j, makes i know this piece of information, and i
and j be aware of this. At least one call is necessary
to inform the third agent that the goal for depth k was
reached, establishing the goal for depth k+1 in k+3
calls.
This establishes Theorem 2, i.e., the minimal num-
ber of calls needed to solve the instance Gossip(k,3)
of the generalized gossip problem is exactly k+2.
9. Gossiping with ignorance goals
In the gossip problem, we aim at full knowledge of
every agent. We could also consider scenarios where
we want that some agents do not learn some secrets.
Assuming agents are obliged to tell all the secrets they
know (say, for example, because they do not know
the goal), the ordering of calls might be influenced by
these ‘ignorance goals.’ This section discusses some
aspects of this variant which, to the best of our knowl-
edge, was not investigated before. Unlike the version
with the ‘full knowledge’ goal, we do not provide a re-
sult on the number of calls or a generic algorithm, but
rather protocols for some specific cases and general re-
marks.
Let us start with the original gossip problem where
the goal is to achieve shared knowledge of order k=1.
Suppose we do not want agent 1 to know the secret of
2, and full knowledge otherwise. Our goal is:
(
EKAgt\{1}sAgt
)
∧
(
K1sAgt\{2}∧¬K1s2
)
.
While this is obviously unsolvable for 2 agents, for
at least 3 agents a successful protocol is one where 1
calls every other agent but 2, and then all agents but 1
call each other until their knowledge is shared. Slightly
more generally, if 1 must not know the secret of 2, . . .,
m then she should call m+1, . . ., n before they call any
of 2, . . ., m, then 2, . . ., m, m+1, . . ., n can freely share
their knowledge.
Things get quickly complicated, even for k=1, when
we require several agents to be ignorant. For example,
suppose n=4 and suppose agent 1 should not know the
secret of agent 3, while 2 should not know the secret of
4. Then 1 should call 2 first, before she calls 4 and be-
fore 2 calls 3. Then 1 can call 4, 2 can call 3 and 3 can
call 4. Now suppose that 1 should not know the secret
of 3, while 3 should not know the secret of 1. Then no
sequence of calls leads to a solution, since every agent
that 1 calls cannot be called by 3 and conversely.
Now consider higher-order order goals. Take k=2
and suppose we want 1 not to know whether 2 knows
the secret of 3 (but we do want 2 to know the secret
of 3). This means that the goal is:
(
EKAgt\{1}EKAgtsAgt
)
∧(
(K1EKAgt\{2}sAgt ∧K1K2sAgt\{3})∧¬K1K2s3
)
.
Then the following protocol is a solution:
1. Agent 2 calls every agent but 3;
2. All agents but 2 call each other until full knowl-
edge of depth 2 is acquired;
3. Agent 2 calls every agent but 1.
After the second step, every agent i different from 2
has almost reached her goal, except that she does not
know whether 2 knows the secret of 3 (because it is not
the case yet). At the third step, 2 calls everyone but 1
in order to learn 3’s secret, acquire the required depth
of knowledge and inform every other agent.
Remark that if we increase the depth k, the goal that
only 1 does not know whether 2 knows the secret of 3
becomes unsolvable. Indeed, by the truth axiom T of
epistemic logic, we have, for example:
K1K4K2s3 → K1K2s3,
and hence the latter cannot be false without the former
being false. Therefore for k>2, the correct specifica-
tion will be that every goal of the form:
K1Ki1 . . .KimK2K j1 . . .K jps3
is false, for m+p+2≤ k.
10. Conclusion
We have provided a logical analysis of the gossip
problem, focusing on how higher-order shared knowl-
edge can be obtained. We did so in a particular dy-
namic epistemic logic: Dynamic Epistemic Logic of
Propositional Assignment and Observation DEL-PAO.
Its integration of knowledge modalities and dynamic
modalities provides a handy language in order to rea-
son about concepts such as an agent being a semi-
expert, which is pivotal in our algorithm. With DEL-
PAO, we were able to prove both the correctness and
optimality of our algorithm, generalizing the results
from [8,32,25] on the minimal number of calls.
The gossip problem recently attracted quite some
attention in the dynamic epistemic logic community
[4,5,38]. The version that we have studied here has a
central scheduler telling each agent when to act and
what to do. Other versions where the protocol is dis-
tributed were investigated recently [3,19]. We believe
that our generalization—as well as further variations
where e.g. calls can only be made according to some
graph structure—provide interesting, canonical multi-
agent planning problems that can be compared to the
blocksworld in classical planning. This is the subject
of ongoing work; first steps are reported in [17,30]. We
believe that our visibility-based approach is an interest-
ing alternative to dynamic epistemic logic-based plan-
ning that was proposed in [13]: indeed, it was shown
that such planning problems are undecidable [7], and
so even for simple instances [15].
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